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ACTION: USDAO, New York

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suitable Caribbean country. This might make arrangement more palatable to Cuba. Mandate would include complete freedom of movement to SIG's rep and staff. Competent military, and technical inspection teams would be included on staff with a right to go to any country in Caribbean at any time without prior invitation. Staff would be recruited by SC from countries within Caribbean area. Mixed teams would inspect; in no case would self inspection be permitted by nationals from country being inspected. SC would be called upon to authorize SIG to undertake arrangements. In order for arrangements be more palatable to UN, cost of UN presence would be defrayed not through regular budget but participating Caribbean nations. It would also be desirable to have UN support such an arrangement to UN by means of a resolution or at least give its blessing to it after arrangements had been worked out by SC. UN might also provide liaison rep at UN representative's headquarters, once UN presence in Caribbean established.

ADVANTAGE

There are serious disadvantages with above proposal.

First, since SIG would insist upon UN authorization, it would intrude Soviet veto into a Western Hemisphere arrangement. This might be avoided if we were able convince SIG to establish UN presence in Caribbean entirely pursuant to his authority under Article 99. While this was done in Laos, presence there was much more modest, and it likely that Thant would at least insist upon an after-the-fact approval by SC. This would

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certainly be ~~the~~ minimal price which Soviets would insist upon, and Cubans, if they entertain idea at all, would also take similar position.

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Moreover we would have to take great care, as in case of Brazilian resolution, to avoid getting into question of transit of nuclear weapons through Panama Canal and overflights in Caribbean.

Thirdly, Cubans would insist that question of guarantees be part of arrangement. While President has publicly given assurances against US invasion of Cuba, our willingness support a Caribbean arrangement, which would inevitably become involved in counter assurances of kind contained in Castro's five demands, would be taken here and abroad as US agreement to guarantee Castro's regime. Such an arrangement might well help keep Castro's government in power.

Fourth, it would be just about as difficult to establish a limited UK presence for Caribbean as it is a denuclearized zone for all of Latin America. Considerable time would be needed to negotiate such an arrangement, and therefore it would not be possible to put it into practical operation in early days of post-nuclear removal period. In these circumstances, it would appear preferable to pursue Brazilian denuclearized zone concept at outset rather than seek more limited UK presence arrangement for Caribbean.

TO: TWF: JJJ: DeGraffenreid

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